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Cole: Criminal Law

SEWING UP THE LOOPHOLE IN

ACCESSORY AFTER TILE FACT CRIMES
I.

INTRODUCTION

In January of 1998, the South Carolina Supreme Court suggested that
Russell Collins would be the last to slip through a small loophole created by
South Carolina common law in the charge of accessory after the fact.' Eight
years earlier on July 25, 1990, Collins and his friend Keith Houston stopped at
a convenience store ostensibly to buy snack food for work the following
morning.2 Houston pulled a gun on the clerk, demanded money, and shot him.?
Collins first told the police that he and his friend heard shots when they arrived
at the store and saw a man with a gun running away.4 He said that after they
found the injured clerk inside, Collins ran next door to his uncle's house to get
help.'
Later, Collins admitted that Houston was the gunman, but maintained
that he had no idea his friend was planning to rob the store or shoot the clerk.6
He claimed he had not collaborated in the commission of the crime, but initially
covered for his friend because Houston had threatened, "'[I]f you don't, then
you gone go to jail too, cause you know they gone say you helped me do it. I'm
a say you helped me do it."' 7
At the end of the State's case, the trial court granted a directed verdict
for Collins on the charges of attempted armed robbery, murder, and possession
of a weapon during a violent crime because the only evidence of his guilt was
his physical presence in the store during the shooting.8 However, the jury
sentenced Collins to fifteen years on the accessory after the fact charge.9 On
appeal Collins argued that he could not be convicted as an accessory after the
fact because he was present at the scene of the crime.'0 The South Carolina
Supreme Court agreed with Collins based on several earlier decisions which
held that absence at the time of the crime's commission was an essential
component ofthe charge of accessory after the fact. " The court then overturned

I. State v. Collins, 329 S.C. 23, 28, 495 S.E.2d 202, 205 (1998).
2. Id. at 25, 495 S.E.2d at 203.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 25, 495 S.E.2d at 204.
8. Id. Traditionally, mere presence at the commission of the crime is insufficient to
support accomplice liability. See infra note 86.
9. Collins, 329 S.C. at 25, 495 S.E.2d at 204.
10. Id.
11. See id. at 26, 495 S.E.2d at 204.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

1

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 50, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 5
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. SO: 901

these cases, ruling that in the future a person's presence at the crime scene
would not necessarily preclude him from being an accessory after the fact."2 By
removing "absence from the crime scene" as an element of the accessory after
the fact offense, the court repaired its earlier unreasonable assumption that a
person present at the commission of the crime must either be guilty as a
principal or not be guilty at all.
Prior to Statev. Collins, South Carolina's version of accessory after the
excluded from criminal liability persons who had certainly aided
illogically
fact
the felon after he had completed the offense, but who were "present" at the
scene of the crime.' 3 Collins removed this requirement and properly allowed
the charge to include those truly guilty as an accessory, regardless of their
presence at the commission of the crime.14
Part II of this Note explores the background of accessory after the fact
and how the offense evolved out of accomplice crime. Part III examines the rise
and fall of the common-law absence requirement by comparing significant
South Carolina cases. Finally, Part IV discusses the consequences of removing
the absence requirement from the common law.
II.

BACKGROUND

The ramifications of the Collins decision are more easily understood
by examining the role of the accessory after the fact charge in the broader
framework of accomplice crime. The fine distinction between the accessory
after the fact and other accessories or actors has confused police, juries, and
judges.
A.

Accomplice Liability

Early in common law, guilty parties to a felony crime were categorized
as either principals or accessories.' 5 The actor that perpetrated the crime was
the principal, and all others involved were accessories. Accessories fell into
three categories depending on their relationship in time and place to the crime:
(1) accessories before the fact, (2) accessories at the fact, and (3) accessories

12. Id. at 27-28, 495 S.E.2d at 205 (overruling State v. Hudgins, 319 S.C. 233, 460
S.E.2d 388 (1995); State v. Whitted, 279 S.C. 260, 262 S.E.2d 388 (1983); State v. Plath, 279
S.C. 260, 284 S.E.2d 221 (1981)). However, the court reversed Russell Collins's conviction
because the court claimed applying the change in common lawretroactively to the time the crime
was committed would result in an ex post facto or due process violation. At the time of the
shooting, the earlier cases controlled. See infra Part I for a discussion of Plath,Hudgins, and
Whitted. Therefore, Collins was entitled to a directed verdict. Id.at 28 & n.4, 495 S.E.2d at 205
& n.4.
13. See Plath, 277 S.C. at 139, 284 S.E.2d at 228 (finding that an accessory's absence
at the time of the crime is an essential element of the offense).
14. Collins, 329 S.C. at 27-28, 495 S.E.2d at 205.
15. Rollin M. Perkins, Partiesto Crime, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 581, 581 (1941).
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after the fact. 16 Later, the party labeled accessory at the fact was renamed a
principal in the second degree. 7
A principal in the first degree is one who commits the crime by his
own hand, by an inanimate agency, or through an innocent party. 8 If X stabs
V, then Xis the principal in the first degree. IfX poisons V's favorite scotch
and V dies from the poison, then, even if X is not present, X is the principal
first. And suppose X, knowing that P suffers from paranoid delusions, gives P
a gun and tells P that V is coming to kill him. IfX then invites V over to visit
P, who subsequently shoots V, X may be a principal in Y's murder if P is
determined to be an innocent agent.' 9More than one person may be first-degree
principals to the crime, if they all participate in the criminal act.20 Suppose X
and Y alternately stab V, who dies from a loss of blood. Both X and Y are
principals first.
A principal in the second degree is one, actually or constructively
present at the crime, who aids, counsels, commands, or encourages its
commission." For example, a principal second may be one who stands by with
a gun while the principal first shoots one of the victims. The principal second
need not be actually present at the commission of the crime if he is aiding the
principal and is close enough to render assistance if needed.' The actor's
constructive presence implicates him as long as he plays an active role in the
crime, such as being either a lookout or a driver of the getaway car.2
An accessory before the fact is one who aids, counsels, commands, or
encourages the commission of the crime, but who is not present "either actually
or constructively at the moment of perpetration."2 4 Suppose Xrecruits A andB
to rob a bank and provides them with guns and masks. X remains at home
while A and B commit the crime. Xis an accessory before the fact.
An accessory after the fact is "one who, with knowledge of the other's
guilt, renders assistance to a felon in the effort to hinder his detection, arrest,
trial or punishment." 25 Suppose after A and B rob the bank, they meet C, who
agrees to hide them in her basement until the police leave the area. Although
C was not involved in the commission of the crime, she is now an accessory
after the fact.
The common-law theory of parties to the crime is premised on the

16. Id.
17. Id.
18. JOSHUA DRESSLER, CRIMINAL LAW 790 (1994).
19. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 38 So. 182, 183 (Ala. 1905) (finding an insane person
an instrumentality of a murder, not the principal).
20. WAYNE R. LAFAvE & AusTIN W. ScoTr, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 570 (2d ed. 1986).

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

See DRESSLER, supra note 18, at 790; LAFAvE & Scorr, supra note 20, at 571.
LAFAVE & ScorT, supra note 20, at 571.
See id.
DRESSLERsupra note 18, at 790.
Id.
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notion that guilt for the commission of one crime may attach to several.26 The
liability of the secondary party-the principal second or accessory before or
after the fact-derives from the criminal act of the primary party.27 This
derivative liability does not mean that the secondary party's actions are the
cause in fact of the crime. The primary actor acts of his own volition. Instead,
the secondary party incurs liability as a legal consequence of his own actions."
For a crime to occur, an actor must complete the bad act with the
requisite bad state of mind.29 Suppose Xfires a gun and kills V. The firing of
the gun is the bad act. IfXfired the gun with the intent to kill , thenX had the
requisite bad state of mind, and he may be charged with murder. But if V
inadvertently jumped into X's line of fire, andX killed him by accident, then
Xdid not commit murder. Conversely, ifXdecides he will kill V,but never acts
on his intent, he has not committed murder. Without both the bad act and the
bad state of mind, no crime exists. For example, in a bank robbery, the primary
actor, or principal first, goes to the bank with the intent to steal the money
(criminal state ofmind) and actually takes the money from the vault (criminal
act). The secondary actor, such as a lookout, goes to the bank with the intent
that the principal will steal the money (criminal state of mind) and serves as a
lookout to warn the principal when the police arrive (criminal act). The
secondary party is not relieved from liability because he did not reach in the
vault himself to grab the money. It is enough that he intended for the crime to
occur, and his actions somehow contributed to its commission. Accomplice
liability "functions like causation [as] it fixes blame upon a person for a
result"-specifically, the unlawful acts of another.3"
B.

Accessory After the FactDistinguishesItself

At early English common law, the penalty for all felony crimes was
execution, and under the notion of accomplice liability, all parties to the crime
were equally guilty of the same primary substantive offense. 3' When statutory
additions increased the number of crimes classified as felonies, general
dissatisfaction with the application of the death penalty to so many resulted in
the creation of several legal devices which made conviction difficult, even in
the face of overwhelming guilt.32 The technicalities imposed strict requirements
on the jurisdiction of the courts, the pleading of the parties, the trial, and the

26. See Perkins, supranote 15, at 586.
27. Sanford H. Kadish, Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study in the Interpretation
ofDoctrine, 73 CAL. L. REv. 324, 337 (1985).
28. Id. This derivative liability, however, should not be confused with vicarious
liability, which depends on the relationship between the two parties. Here, the secondary party
performs some action consistent with the primary actor's intent. Id.
29. Id. at 346.
30. Id. at 356.
31. See Perkins, supra note 15, at 613.
32. Id. at 607.
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degree of guilt.33
When most felonies were removed from the status of capital crimes,
the underlying purpose for the technical distinctions in procedure became
obsolete." Most states legislated some form of change to common-law
accomplice liability.3" As a result, some jurisdictions contain remnants of the
common-law hindrances to conviction of accessories.36 Perhaps the role most
affected by statutory modification was the accessory after the fact. Even in
early English common law, the harm caused by the accessory after the fact was
considered less threatening than the harm caused by the principals or the
accessories before the fact.37 Before benefit of clergy was abolished in England,
it was afforded to accessories after the fact in circumstances in which other
parties to the crime were denied the privilege. 38 The old common-law notion
that the liability ofthe accessory after the fact attached by tainting him with the
crime of the primary actor gave way to the modem idea that the accessory after
the fact is guilty of a separate substantive offense. 39Because an accessory after
the fact becomes involved in the crime only after its commission and has had
no role in causing the felony, his criminal intent is to impede justice. 0
C.

Accomplice Liability and Accessory After the Factin South
Carolina

The development of accomplice liability in South Carolina was not
unusual. Principals first and second were defined by their traditional commonlaw roles, but South Carolina courts placed little importance on the distinction
between the two in terms of pleading, procedure, and sentencing.4' Presence at
the scene is the crucial distinction between principals and accessories before
the fact. An accessory before the fact aids and abets the principal, but is not
actually or constructively present at the commission of the crime.42 Although
the South Carolina Code groups the accomplice and principal roles together for

33. Id. For example, the accessory could be tried only in the jurisdiction where the
accessory acts took place, not where the crime occurred. See id.at 609-10. Also, an actor could
not be charged with the felony as aprincipal ifevidence suggested he was an accessory, and vice
versa. Id. at 610.
34. Id. at615.
35. Id.
36. See id.
37. See id. at 621-22.
38. Id.
39. See ROLLINM. PERKINS &RONALD W. BOYCE, CRIMINALLAW 728 (3d ed. 1982).
40. Id. at 765.
41. WILLIAM SHEPARD MCANINCH & W. GASTON FAIREY, THE CRIMINAL LAW OF
SOUTH CAROLINA 362 (3d ed. 1996). However, a notable exception to this general rule is the
commission of vehicular crimes. The driver must be distinguished from the aider and abetter on
separate theories of culpability. See id. at 363.
42. See id.
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the sake of punishment, 43 South Carolina retains some of the common-law
peculiarities that maintain barriers to convictions in accomplice crimes. Some
precedents suggest that should the State convict a defendant indicted as a
principal when the evidence tends to show guilt as an accessory before the fact,
the conviction is illegal." However, should the State withdraw a prosecution
for murder, a later accessory-before-the-fact charge would not be precluded.45
In South Carolina, an accessory after the fact is one who (1) harbors
and assists the principal felon (2) after the felony has been completed (3)
knowing the felon has committed the offense. ' As in otherjurisdictions, South
Carolina eventually recognized that the accessory after the fact was guilty of
a separate substantive offense than that of the original felony.47 The Code of
Laws of South Carolina, although silent on the definition of accessory after the
fact, does prescribe this type of accessory's punishment "based upon the
classification below the punishment provided for the principal offense.,, 4 1 South

Carolina refused to assign as much blame to the accessory after the fact as to
the other parties to the crime. If distinguishing between the accessory before
the fact and the principals was important in the common law even when the
punishment was the same, then distinguishing between the common-law

43. The South Carolina Code provides:
A person who aids in the commission of a felony or
is an accessory before the fact in the commission of
a felony by counseling, hiring, or otherwise procuring
the felony to be committed is guilty of a felony and,
upon conviction, must be punished in the manner
prescribed for the punishment of the principal felon.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1-40 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1998).
44. See, e.g., State v. Sheriff, 118 S.C. 327, 327-28, 110 S.E. 807, 807 (1922).
45. See State v. Jennings, 158 S.C. 422,425,155 S.E. 621,622 (1930). However, this
case seems to be overruledby S.C. CODEANN. § 16-1-40 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1998), which states
that accessories before the fact and all principals are punished in the manner prescribed for the
principal. See supra note 43. But later cases, decided after the enactment of the statute and its
similar predecessor, are also inconsistent with the notion that all parties to the crime, with the
exception of accessory after the fact, are guilty of the same substantive offense. In State v. Cox,
290 S.C. 489, 351 S.E.2d 570 (1986), the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the
defendant's conviction as an accessory before and after the fact to murder because the trial judge
incorrectly instructed the jury that the principal must be found guilty before the accessory could
be convicted. Id. at 492-93, 351 S.E.2d at 572. The court did not comment on the conviction of
one defendant as both accessory before and accessory after the fact even though conviction of
both offenses is contrary to the rationale for accomplice liability. An accessory before the fact
is guilty ofmurder because he had the requisite criminal intent for the offense (an intent that the
victim die) and aided the principal in accomplishing that objective. See supra note 29 and
accompanying text. The accessory before the fact is thus equivalent to the principal. To see the
accessory before the fact also as an accessory after the fact leads to the illogical position that a
murderer can be guilty of aiding himself to escape detention. Carried to its logical conclusion,
this would mean that all criminals who attempted to avoid detection would be guilty as
accessories after the fact in addition to their guilt for the underlying offense.
46. See State v. Nicholson, 221 S.C. 399, 405, 70 S.E.2d 632, 634 (1952).
47. See McANNCH &FAIREY, supra note 41, at 369.
48. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1-55.
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accessory after the fact and the other parties was critical because even the
legislature intended that these actors be removed from accomplice liability.
In South Carolina, accessory after the fact now has more in common
with the offenses ofmisprison of felony and compounding crime.49 The focus
in these offenses is not on the commission of the original crime, but on
another's actions after, and in response to, that event. An actor is guilty of the
common-law misdemeanor of misprison of felony if he criminally neglects to
prevent the felony from being committed or if afterwards he fails to bring the
felon to justice, but is not so involved as to make him an accessory before or
after the fact.5" Suppose X is an eyewitness to a bank robbery. When the police
arrive, he quickly leaves the scene. On independent information the police learn
he was present and question him. X denies being at the scene and refuses to
provide any information to the police that might help identify the perpetrators.
Later X admits to being at the scene and witnessing the robbery, but no
evidence suggests he is in any way involved in the crime. Xmay be guilty of
misprison of felony. 5' Although there are no reported cases in South Carolina,
the common law also recognizes the offense of compounding crime, which is
the agreement, for consideration received, not to prosecute or inform on one
who has committed a crime.52
The accessory after the fact is a unique criminal actor whose role
evolved out of the already complicated notion of accomplice liability and into
the less morally reprehensible field (as measured by penalty) of obstruction-ofjustice crimes. Although in theory the accessory after the fact is far removed
from the original parties to the crime, in reality the distinctions are often
confused and misinterpreted. The true distinction between the accomplice and
the accessory after the fact is having the intention to aid the commission of the
crime-accomplice-versus having no intent to aid the crime and providing no
assistance in its commission, but only becoming involved after the social harm
has taken place-accessory after the fact. The only difference in the label ofthe
crimes of accessory before the fact and accessory after the fact is one
preposition, implying superficially only a temporal distinction between the
elements. If the crucial distinction between the accessory before the fact and
the principals first and second is the element of presence at the commission of
the crime, then that element of presence might be easily, but mistakenly,
transferred to the crime of accessory after the fact. These fine distinctions in
terminology, combined with an inconsistent eradication of procedural
complications, created a likely atmosphere for the Collins loophole to emerge.
49. See MCANiNCH &FAmEY, supra note 41, at 370.
50. Id. (quoting State v. Carson, 274 S.C. 316, 318, 262 S.E.2d 918, 920 (1980)).
51. See Carson, 274 S.C. at 317, 262 S.E.2d at 919.
52. MCANiNCH &FAIREY, supra note 41, at 370. "Agreements to... stifle public
prosecutions are contrary to public policy." Id. Of course, some statutes authorize practices such
as restitution in exchange for the dismissal of charges, abandoning public policy for practicality
and judicial economy. See generally S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-11-615 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1998)
(authorizing restitution for the unlawful destruction of timber).
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DEVELOPMENT THROUGH THE COMMON LAW

Collins's appeal forced the South Carolina Supreme Court to consider
how the elements of the criminal charge of accessory after the fact had evolved
to the case before them. Citing a foundation in case law dating back to the
1950s, the court began with the historically basic elements of the crime: (1) the
felony is complete, (2) the accused knows the principal committed the felony,
and (3) the accused harbors or assists the principal.53 However, the court cited
three cases in which the additional requirement that the accused be absent from
the commission of the crime made its way into the common law.54
A.

State v. Plath

The facts of State v. Plath" are quite "sordid."56 Cindy Sheets,
girlfriend of the accused John Plath, and a juvenile female, girlfriend of the
accused John Arnold, testified in exchange for immunity about the kidnapping
and murder of Betty Adkins. 7 According to the two girls, all four were present
when they picked up Adkins while she was hitchhiking.58 They took her to a
wooded area near a dump, forced her to perform sexual acts with Plath and
Sheets, stomped on her, beat her with a belt, hit her with a jagged bottle,
stabbed her, and choked her with a garden hose.59 They then left her body in the
wooded area. 6° At trial Plath tried to minimize his role in the crime, but never
denied his presence during its commission. 1
On appeal Plath argued that the trial judge should have instructed the
jury on the law of accessory after the fact.62 The supreme court cited the three
elements of Nicholson and further added that "[the accessory's absence at the
time the crime was actually committed is necessarily implied from the above
definition and is an essential element of the offense. 63 In support of this
expansion, the court cited Corpus Juris Secundum and American

53. State v. Collins, 329 S.C. 23, 25-26, 495 S.E.2d 202, 204 (1998) (citing State v.
Nicholson, 221 S.C. 399,405,70 S.E.2d 632,634 (1952)). In Nicholson, the defendant received
a stolen adding machine and passed it along to one ofthe other defendants for sale. The State had
not presented any evidence that the defendant knew the machine had been stolen, and the
conviction was reversed. Nicholson, 221 S.C. at 404-05, 70 S.E.2d 634.
54. Collins,329 S.C. at 26, 495 S.E.2d at 204.
55. 277 S.C. 126, 284 S.E.2d 221 (1981).
56. Id. at 131,284 S.E.2d at 224.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 139, 284 S.E.2d at 228.
63. Id.
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Jurisprudence." CorpusJurisSecundum states this proposition directly," and
American Jurisprudenceprovides that "[a]ccessories include persons who in
some manner are connected with a crime, either before or after its perpetration,
but who are not present at the time the crime is committed." 66 From the
Nicholson elements and the legal-encyclopedia explanations of accessory after
the fact, the court concluded that because "Plath admitted he was present at the
scene of the crime, the elements of accessory after the fact were not present"
and affirmed the trial judge's refusal to charge the jury.67 The decision is
unclear about whether the court erroneously equated presence with actual
participation in the crime or simply declined to distinguish them in this case
because Plath, never denying his involvement, only tried to minimize his role.
This case would not turn on any fine distinction between mere presence and
presence and participation, and the court did not clarify its position.
B.

State v. Whitted

Following closely on the heels of Plath,the court in State v. Whitted"s
focused on the importance ofthe defendant's presence at the commission of the
crime because the defendant's guilt as an accessory after the fact would
preclude culpability of a greater offense. 69 Louise Whitted was indicted for
murder, accessory before and after the fact to murder, and conspiracy to
commit murder."0 The trial judge refused to accept her guilty plea to the
accessory-after-the-fact charge.7' The supreme court correctly stated that in
accessory-after-the-fact crimes, "the accused's involvement begins after the
crime is accomplished," but presupposed this with the observation that "[o]ne
element of accessory after the fact is the absence of the accused at the scene of
the crime."'72 If the accused had been an accessory after the fact, then she could
not also have been guilty as a principal actor in the commission of the crime.
Her attorney freely admitted that had the judge permitted her to plead guilty to
accessory after the fact, he would have moved for a dismissal of the murder
charge.73 The judge correctly instructed the members of the jury to consider the
murder charges first and then to consider the accessory charge only if they
found her not guilty of the former.74 The judge's instructions and pretrial
rulings reinforced the notion that the crimes were mutually exclusive, but

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id.
22 C.J.S. CriminalLaw § 95 (1961).
40 AM. JuR. 2D Homicide § 28 (1968).
Plath, 277 S.C. at 139, 284 S.E.2d at 228.
279 S.C. 260, 305 S.E.2d 245 (1983).
Id. at 262, 305 S.E.2d at 246-47.
Id. at 261,305 S.E.2d at 246.
Id. at 262, 305 S.E.2d at 247.
Id. at 262, 305 S.E.2d at 246.
Id. at 262, 305 S.E.2d at 246-47.
Id. at 263, 305 S.E.2d at 247.
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apparently premised the orders on the accused's presence at the crime rather
than on her participation."
C.

State v. Hudgins

State v. Hudgins7 involved two young men, aged seventeen and
eighteen, who were stopped while driving a stolen truck with a hose dragging
250 feet behind them." When Officer Chris Taylor asked the men about the
hose, he was unaware the vehicle was stolen.7' Because it was raining at the
time, the officer suggested they sit in his patrol car to discuss the matter.79
When Officer Taylor turned and began walking toward his car, one of the men
shot him in the head." The two men ran away and hid the gun, but were
arrested a few days later.8" Both men's statements implicated Hudgins, the
seventeen year old, as the "triggerman." 2 Cheek, Hudgins' companion, pled
guilty to accessory after the fact and testified for the State. 3 Hudgins later
claimed he admitted to the shooting only because he was the younger of the
two men and thought that "the system would be more lenient on him."' He was
convicted of murder and larceny and sentenced to death."
Hudgins argued on appeal that the trial judge erred by refusing to
instruct the jury on accessory after the fact and, alternatively, mere presence. 6
Though the decision is unclear about what evidence Hudgins introduced to
support his defense, his request to the judge to instruct the jury on accessory
after the fact and mere presence suggests that he argued his companion was the
triggerman while he stood by, unaware his friend was about to shoot Taylor.
The court upheld the trial court's ruling, stating that because the "appellant
admitted to being present when the murder occurred, he was not entitled to an

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

See id. at 262, 305 S.E.2d at 246.
319 S.C. 233,460 S.E.2d 388 (1995).
Id. at 235, 460 S.E.2d at 389.
Id.
Id.

80. Id.
81. Id.

82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 236, 460 S.E.2d at 390. Mere presence is not sufficient to support
accomplice liability. State v. Johnson, 291 S.C. 127, 129, 352 S.E.2d 480,482 (1987). When a
question exists as to whether a person is an accomplice, the trial court may be required to instruct
the jury that one must "'personally commit the crime or be present at the scene of the crime and
intentionally, or through a common design, aid, abet, or assist in the commission of that crime
through some overt act."' State v. Dennis, 321 S.C. 413, 420, 468 S.E.2d 674, 678 (Ct. App.
1996) (quoting State v. Austin, 299 S.C. 456, 459, 385 S.E.2d 830, 832 (1989)). If Hudgins
testified that he was not the triggerman and provided no assistance to Cheek, there appears to be
no basis to refuse his requested instruction.
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instruction on accessory after the fact."87
An interesting aspect of this case reveals the inconsistent application
of the absence requirement. The court did not object to accepting the
companion's guilty plea to accessory after the fact despite his presence at the
commission of the crime. The absence requirement prevented Hudgins from
obtaining the requested jury instruction, but did not apply to Cheek when
Cheek agreed to testify for the State that Hudgins was the one who pulled the
trigger. More than two years before the Collins decision, if the companion had
truly satisfied the Nicholson elements of accessory after the fact,88 but had been
present at the commission of the crime, he should have slipped through the
loophole created in Plath as well and walked away from the charge.
D.

State v. Collins

In Collins the court said,
It is clear from a reading ofPlath,Hudgins,
and Whitted that the result in those cases
was based on the fact that there was
evidence adduced at trial which
demonstrated participation in the actual
commission of the substantive offense of
murder. There is, however, a distinction
between being present and participatingin
the crime, and being merely present during
the commission of the crime. 89
Byway of explanation, the court cited textbook authority that suggests
it is indeed possible to be present at the scene of the crime, not actively
participate in its commission (mere presence), and then later aid or assist the
felon. 9° The Collins court viewed the precedent established by Plath, Whitted,
and Hudgins as if such a scenario had never occurred to it (although it occurred
to Hudgins's companion as demonstrated through his guilty plea) and declared
a "modifiication]" of existing case law.9'
IV.

IMPACT OF THE COLLINS DECISION
The introduction of the absence requirement into the common law

87. Hudgins, 319 S.C. at 237, 460 S.E.2d at 390 (citing State v. Plath, 277 S.C. 126,
284 S.E.2d 221 (1981)).
88. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
89. State v. Collins, 329 S.C. 23,26,495 S.E. 2d 202,204 (1998) (citations omitted).
90. Id. at 27, 495 S.E.2d at 204 (citing MCANINCH &FAMREY,supra note 41, at 368).
91. Id. at 26-28, 495 S.E.2d at 204-05.
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afterPlathresulted in both positive and negative consequences for a defendant
charged as an accessory after the fact. The South Carolina Supreme Court did
open a loophole through which one who had admittedly aided a felon after the
completed offense could pass without recourse. But this seemingly prodefendant oddity actually worked against the accused in Plath, Whitted, and
Hudgins.In these cases, upon evidence showing the defendant's presence at the
commission of the crime, the courts denied the defense the option of taking the
accessory- after-the-fact charge to the jury. No matter how unlikely, if given
the instruction, the jury might have believed the defense's version of the facts,
acquitted the defendant of the substantive charge, and convicted him only of
the lesser charge of accessory after the fact. In the already confusing
application of accomplice liability, the absence requirement made it impossible,
in some instances, to punish the defendant for his actual crime.
A.

Before Collins

Prior to Collins,the absence requirement constrained law enforcement,
in the form of state prosecutors, to choose between over-charging a Collins
defendant as a principal first or second and not charging him at all. Accessory
after the fact, even underPlath,was a separate substantive offense, not a lesser
included one. Thus, the prosecution did not have the option of asking the jury
to convict the defendant of accessory after the fact unless the defendant had
actually been indicted on that charge. Even if prosecutors indicted on both of
these inconsistent offenses, the absence requirement meant throwing out the
accessory-after-the-fact charge (on evidence of presence) and leaving the jury
with the option of finding the defendant guilty as the principal or not guilty at
all. Unfortunately, neither under nor over charging is appropriate. One who
knowingly aids a felon to avoid apprehension has committed a serious crime.
Prior to Collins, if a person is guilty when he is absent from the scene, he is
certainly no less culpable when he is present. Neither prosecutors nor society
would feel comfortable releasing the accused because of an insignificant
technicality: his physical presence at the commission of the crime. On the
other hand, policy does not support convicting a man of a crime for which he
is not guilty. When physical presence transforms him in the eyes of the
prosecutor into a principal or accomplice, then the accused accepts more of the
blame than that for which he is responsible. South Carolina statutory law takes
a stand on the punishment of the accessory after the fact, mandating that he be
sentenced to a lesser term than the principal.92 When the jury is deprived of the
accessory-after-the-fact instruction, the absence requirement creates problems
in certain circumstances forboth prosecutors and defenders who cannot assign
the appropriate responsibility for the defendant's crime.
Practically, the absence requirement served another purpose: it

92. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1-55 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1998).
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provided clarity. Obstruction-of-justice crimes, which accessory after the fact
is now considered to be, are separate and distinct from accomplice liability. The
physical aspect of the absence requirement clarified the definitive and moral
differences between the two types of crimes. The most important audience to
understand this difference is the trier of fact. If law enforcement and the
judicial system can become confused and misinterpret the common-law
elements of the crime, then juries could certainly struggle as well. Presence or
absence at the commission of the crime is an efficient way to distinguish
among accessories before the fact, principals, and accessories after the fact. If
the accused is present and somehow connected to the crime, then the jury may
easily believe he is guilty ofthe substantive charge. But if he is not present and
gets involved later, then he can be guilty of only the less severe charge. The
absence requirement made the distinction between obstructors and accomplices
simple. Of course this "clarity" is appropriate only when all individuals present
at the commission of the crime are, in fact, principals. The distinction actually
obscures the truth when one merely present makes no attempt to aid and abet.
B.

After Collins

The Collins decision effectively sealed the loophole that, in limited
circumstances, precluded the conviction of a true accessory after the fact who
was present at the commission of the crime. In theory the removal of the
absence requirement levels the playing field. Prosecutors will no longer be
forced in these circumstances to choose between watching a guilty man go free
and charging him with an inappropriate crime. Moreover, those who aid and
abet after the fact can expect the punishment to fit the crime.
The burden on the prosecutors to prove the accused's behavior after
the fact will not change because of the Collins decision. The accused must still
provide the requisite assistance after the commission of the crime to obstruct
or hinder sufficiently the apprehension of the felon. But realistically if the
defendant is present during the crime, prosecutors will more than likely still
pursue a principal charge because they can usually convince the jury that a
present individual was, in fact, playing some role in the commission of the
crime. Although the prosecution must prove the requisite criminal act
accompanied by the requisite criminal state of mind in situations like that in
Collins, the evidence already tends to be consistent with the principal second
charge. That the accused later intended to obstruct justice by aiding the felon
suggests, but does not prove, that he had the requisite state of mind during the
commission of the crime. His presence at the commission of the crime suggests
(but again, does not necessarily prove) he committed the requisite criminal act.
To sustain a principal second charge, the prosecution need show only that the
accused somehow aided the principal first during the commission of the crime.
Because a principal second can aid the principal first during the crime by acting
as a lookout or being available to render assistance if necessary, the accused
may be guilty as a principal second even if he appears to do nothing. If his
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actions are not indicative of his role, then the charge turns on his state of mind
at the commission of the crime. Which proposition is a jury more likely to
believe about one who later aids the felon by hindering the felon's prosecution:
(1) that he had no intention of aiding the principal first at the commission of the
crime and was, perhaps, unaware that the crime was about to be committed; or
(2) that he was present for the purpose of aiding the principal first and was
actually participating in the crime? The prosecution may have little difficulty
convincing the jury that a present (but true) accessory after the fact is instead
a principal second. Rarely does a defendant escape responsibility for the
substantive offense if he is at the scene with the perpetrators because
prosecutors can usually provide some theory as to how his "presence" aided the
principals. 93 If this argument fails and the evidence suggests the accused was
present, but not involved in the crime, then the prosecution can ask for a jury
instruction on accessory after the fact as an alternative to the substantive
charge.
Practically, the court's removal of the absence requirement allows the
defense and prosecution to compromise. Although accessory after the fact is
not a lesser and included charge of a substantive crime-the elements are, in
fact, necessarily mutually exclusive-evidentiary considerations may
encourage one charged as a principal second to a crime to plea bargain down
to the less severe accessory-after-the-fact offense. If the evidence suggests, but
is not clear, that the accused played a role in the commission of the crime and
later aided the felon, neither the prosecution nor the defense may want to go to
the expense of trial on the principle charge. If the accused is a true accessory
after the fact who happens to be present at the commission, the compromise
leads to truth in punishment. Ifhe is actually a principal second, then the State
at least secures some form of conviction for a guilty individual.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Collins decision impacts a small area of criminal justice in South
Carolina by giving notice to prosecutors and defenders of an opportunity to
reach a right result in the charge of accessory after the fact-whether the path
be through an efficient compromise or through a prolonged trial that turns on
the actions of one individual during the commission of the crime. The
requirement that the accused be absent from the scene of the crime was
illogically introduced into the common law in the early 1980s. The absence
requirement improperly relieved one actor of culpability even when all the
substantive elements of his guilt were adequately proven or, more often, denied
some defendants the opportunity to present the jury with an alternative to

93. Strangely, the trial court granted a directed verdict in Collins's favor on the
murder charge. Collins, 329 S.C. at 25, 495 S.E.2d at 204. The jury was never allowed to
determine whether Collins was merely present or actually played some role in the commission
of the crime as an aider or abetter.
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conviction of the more severe substantive crime. The Collins decision removes
this element from the common law and levels the playing field for both the
State and the defense. Now, to preserve justice, courts, prosecutors, and
defenders have a greater responsibility to explain the fine distinction between
accomplices and accessories after the fact to the trier of fact in Collins-like
cases. The true elements ofthe charges, the actions ofthe accused, and his state
of mind become critical now that both prosecutors and defenders have another
option for explaining a defendant's presence at the commission of the crime.
In reality, prosecutors may still pursue the principal charge of the substantive
offense, and the defense may seek an acquittal. But when faced with a difficult
case, both sides may willingly plea bargain down to accessory after the fact. At
its most influential, when the truth is not always clear, the Collins decision to
seal the loophole allows a practical means to a morally correct end.
Susannah Rawl Cole
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